Productivity Growth in Japan and the United States by Dale W. Jorgenson & Masahiro Kuroda
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Productivity Growth in Japan and the United States
Volume Author/Editor: Charles R. Hulten, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-36059-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/hult91-1
Conference Date: August 26-28, 1985
Publication Date: January 1991
Chapter Title: Productivity and International Competitiveness in Japan and
the United States, 1960-1985
Chapter Author: Dale W. Jorgenson, Masahiro Kuroda
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8442
Chapter pages in book: (p. 29 - 57)1  Productivity and International 
Competitiveness in Japan and the 
United States, 1960-1985 
Dale W.  Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda 
1.1  Introduction 
The political relationship between Japan and the United States has become 
increasingly preoccupied with “trade frictions.” These disputes over trade is- 
sues have  accompanied the massive expansion of  Japanese exports to the 
United States. Explanations for the resulting trade imbalance must include 
variations in the yen-to-dollar exchange rate, changes in the relative prices of 
capital and labor in the two countries, and the relative growth of productivity 
in Japanese and U.S.  industries. We  analyze the role of each of these factors 
in explaining the rise in competitiveness  of Japanese industries  relative to their 
U. S . counterparts. 
At the outset of our discussion it is essential to define a measure of interna- 
tional competitiveness. Our measure of international competitiveness is the 
price of an industry’s output in Japan relative to the price in the United States. 
Japanese exports are generated by U.S. purchases from Japanese industries, 
while U.S. exports result from Japanese purchases from U.S. industries. The 
relative price of an industry’s output enters the decisions of purchasers in both 
countries and the rest of the world. In order to explain changes in international 
competitiveness we must account for changes in the determinants of this rela- 
tive price. 
Dale W.  Jorgenson is a professor of  economics at Harvard University. Masahiro Kuroda is a 
professor of economics, Faculty of Business and Commerce, Keio University. 
This paper was prepared for presentation at the Social Science Research Council Conference on 
International Productivity and Competitiveness, held  at Stanford, California, 28-30  October 
1988. We  are grateful to Paul David and Bert Hickman for their comments on an earlier draft of 
the paper and advice about presentation of the final manuscript. Obviously, they do not share our 
responsibility for any remaining deficiencies in the paper. We  are also indebted to Mieko Nishi- 
mizu for her collaboration on earlier phases of the research that we report in this paper. Financial 
support for this research has been provided by the Harvard-MITI World Oil Project and the Pro- 
gram on Technology and Economic Policy of  Harvard University. 
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The starting point for our analysis of the competitiveness of Japanese and 
U.S. industries is the yen-to-dollar exchange rate. This is simply the number 
of  yen  required to purchase one U.S.  dollar in  the market for foreign ex- 
change. Variations in the yen-to-dollar exchange rate are easy to document 
and are often used to characterize movements in relative prices in the two 
countries. However, movements in relative prices of  goods and services do 
not coincide with variations in the exchange rate. To account for changes in 
international competitiveness a measure of the relative prices of specific goods 
and services is required. 
To assess the international competitiveness of Japanese and U.S. industries 
it is necessary to carry out price comparisons for industry outputs in the two 
countries. These comparisons are hampered by  the fact that the makeup of 
a given  industry may  differ substantially between Japan and the  U.S.  For 
example, the steel industry produces an enormous range of  different steel 
products. The relative importance of different types of  steel differs between 
the two countries.  The composition of  the output of  the steel industry in 
each country also changes over time. These differences must be taken into ac- 
count in comparing the relative prices of  steel between Japan and the United 
States. 
Relative prices between Japanese and U.S. industries can be summarized 
by  means of purchasing power parities. The purchasing power parity for a 
specific industry’s output is the number of yen required in Japan to purchase 
an amount of the industry’s output that would cost one dollar in the United 
States. The dimensions of purchasing power parities are the same as the yen- 
to-dollar exchange rate,  namely, yen  per  dollar.  However,  the purchasing 
power parities reflect the relative prices of  the goods and services that make 
up the industry’s output in both countries. 
The most familiar application of the notion of purchasing power parity is to 
the relative prices of such aggregates as the gross domestic product. This ap- 
plication has been the focus of  the landmark studies of Kravis, Heston, and 
Summers (1978). As a consequence of their research, it is now possible to 
compare the relative prices of  gross domestic product for a wide range of 
countries, including Japan and the United States. Kravis, Heston, and Sum- 
mers have based their purchasing power parities for gross domestic product 
on relative prices for 153 commodity groups. 
In this study we estimate purchasing power parities for 29 industries in 
Japan and the United States for the period 1960-85.  These are relative prices 
of the outputs of each industry in the two countries in terms of yen per dollar. 
We  divide the relative price of  each industry’s output by  the yen-to-dollar 
exchange rate  to translate purchasing power parities into relative prices in 
terms of dollars.’ We find it convenient to employ relative prices in dollars as 
measures of international competitiveness. Variations in the exchange rate are 
reflected in the relative prices of outputs for all 29 industries. 
To  account for changes in international competitiveness between Japanese 
and U.S. industries, we have compiled purchasing power parities for the in- 31  International Competitiveness 
puts into each industry. By analogy with outputs, the purchasing power pari- 
ties for inputs are based on the relative prices of the goods and services that 
make up the inputs of each industry. We  have disaggregated inputs among 
capital and labor services, which are primary factors of production, and en- 
ergy and other intermediate goods, which are produced by one industry and 
consumed by other industries. We can translate purchasing power parities for 
inputs into relative prices in dollars by dividing by the yen-to-dollar exchange 
rate. We describe purchasing power parities for output and inputs in 29 indus- 
tries of the United States and Japan in section 1.2 below. 
Our final step in accounting for international competitiveness between Jap- 
anese and U.S. industries is to measure the relative levels of productivity for 
all 29 industries. For this purpose we employ a model of production for each 
industry. This model enables us to express the price of output in each country 
as a function of the prices of inputs and the level of productivity in that coun- 
try.  We  can account for the relative prices of output between Japan and the 
United States by allowing input prices and levels of productivity to differ be- 
tween countries. We  have compiled data on relative productivity levels in Ja- 
pan and the United States for the period 1960-85.  For this purpose we have 
revised and extended the estimates for 1960-79  reported by  Jorgenson, Ku- 
roda, and Nishimizu (1987). 
The methodology for our study was originated by Jorgenson and Nishimizu 
(1978). They provided a theoretical framework for productivity comparisons 
based on a bilateral production function at the aggregate level. They employed 
this framework in  comparing aggregate output, input, and productivity for 
Japan and the United States.z This methodology was extended to the industry 
level by Jorgenson and Nishimizu (198 1) and employed in international com- 
parisons between Japanese and U.S. industries. The industry-level methodol- 
ogy introduced models of production for individual industries based on bilat- 
eral production functions for each industry. This methodology was used in 
Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987), which involved comparisons be- 
tween Japan and the United States at the industry level for the period 1960- 
79.  We  discuss the  theoretical framework  for  international comparisons 
briefly in the appendix to this paper. 
We  present comparisons of  productivity levels between the United States 
and  Japan by  industry in  section 1.3. Jorgenson, Kuroda, and  Nishimizu 
(1987) have presented a taxonomy of Japanese and U.S. industries, based on 
the development of relative productivity levels over the period 1960-79.  They 
have used this taxonomy to project the likely development of relative produc- 
tivity levels for each industry. We  can now assess the validity of these projec- 
tions on the basis of developments during the period 1960-85.  We  find that 
the taxonomy has been very useful in forming expectations about future de- 
velopments in productivity. Finally, we employ changes in relative productiv- 
ity levels and relative prices of  inputs in accounting for changes in interna- 
tional competitiveness between Japanese and U.S. industries over the period 
1960-85.  Section 1.4 provides a summary and conclusion. 32  Dale W.  Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda 
1.2  Purchasing Power Parities 
We treat data on production patterns in Japan and the United States as sepa- 
rate sets of observations. We  assume that these observations are generated by 
bilateral models of production for each industrial sector presented in detail in 
the appendix. We  can describe the implications of the theory of production in 
terms of production functions for each industry. These production functions 
give industry outputs as functions of  capital, labor, energy, and other inter- 
mediate inputs, a dummy variable equal to one for Japan and zero for the 
United States, and time as an index of technology. 
In our bilateral models of  production, the capital, labor, energy, and other 
intermediate input prices are aggregates that depend on the prices of individ- 
ual capital inputs, labor inputs, energy inputs, and other intermediate inputs 
in Japan and the United States. The product of price and quantity indices must 
equal the value of all the components of each aggregate. We  define price in- 
dices corresponding to each aggregate as ratios of the value of the components 
of the aggregate to the corresponding quantity index. In international compar- 
isons, the price indices represent purchasing power parities between the yen 
and the dollar. For example, the price index for labor input represents the 
Japanese price in yen for labor input costing one in the United States. 
Our methodology for estimating purchasing power parities is based on link- 
ing time-series data sets on prices in Japan and the United States. Suppose that 
we observe the price of the output of the ith industry in Japan and the United 
States, say q,(JAPAN) and q,(US),  in the base period, where these prices are 
evaluated in terms of yen and dollars, respectively. We can define thepurchas- 
ing power parity for the output of the ith industry, say PPP,, as follows: 
(i= 1,2  ,...,  I). 
qi(JAPAN) 
PPP, = 
4i(US)  ' 
The purchasing power parity gives the number of  yen  required in Japan to 
purchase an amount of the output of the ith industry costing one dollar in the 
United States in the base period. 
To estimate purchasing power parities for outputs of all industries in Japan 
and the United States, we first construct a time series of prices for the output 
of  each industry in both countries in domestic currency. To  obtain price in- 
dices for industry outputs in the United States, we normalize the price index 
for each industry, say q,(US, T), at unity in the base period. We  normalize the 
corresponding price index for Japan, say qi(JAPAN, T), at the purchasing 
power parity in the base period. We  obtain estimates of  purchasing power 
parities for all years, say PPP,(T), from these price indices and the purchasing 
power parity for the base period from the equation 33  International Competitiveness 
where  PPPi(0)  is  the  purchasing  power  parity  in  the  base  period  and 
q,(JAPAN,O) and qi(US,O) are the prices of outputs of the ith industry in Japan 
and the United States in the base period. 
Finally, we define the relative  price of the output of the ith industry in Japan 
and the United States in dollars, say p,(JAPAN,US), as the ratio of the pur- 
chasing power parity for that industry to the yen-to-dollar exchange rate, say 
E: 
PPP  . 
p,(JAPAN,US) = -’, 
E 
(i = 1, 2, . . . ,  I).  (3) 
The relative price of  the output of the ith industry in Japan and the United 
States is the ratio of the number of  dollars required in Japan to purchase an 
amount of the industry’s output costing one dollar in the United States. This 
index is our measure of  international competitiveness between the Japanese 
industry and its U.S. counterpart. 
In order to construct purchasing power parities and the corresponding rela- 
tive prices between Japanese and U.S. industries, we require an estimate of 
the purchasing power parity for each industry in the base period.  For this 
purpose we have developed purchasing power parities for industry outputs 
based on the results of Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1978). They have pro- 
vided purchasing power parities between the yen and the dollar for 153 com- 
modity groups for the year 1970. These commodity groups are components of 
the gross domestic product of  each country, corresponding to deliveries to 
final demand at purchasers’ prices. 
We construct purchasing power parities for industry outputs, energy inputs, 
and other intermediate inputs by  mapping the  153 commodity groups em- 
ployed by Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1978) into the industry classifica- 
tion system shown in table 1.1. Unfortunately, a complete correspondence 
between the two systems is impossible, since not all intermediate  goods deliv- 
ered by the different industrial sectors are included among the 153 commodity 
groups delivered to final demand. We  have eliminated the gap between the 
two systems by utilizing the purchasing power parities of close substitutes for 
a given industry’s deliveries to intermediate demand. 
To  obtain purchasing power parities for industry outputs from the produc- 
er’s point of view, we adjust the price indices for commodity groups in Japan 
and the United States by  “peeling off’ the indirect taxes paid and trade and 
transportation margins for each industry. We  estimate these margins from the 
interindustry transactions table for 1970 for each country. To  obtain the pur- 
chasing power parities for industry outputs, we aggregate the results for com- 
modity groups, using as weights the relative shares of  each commodity in the 
value of industry output from the 1970 interindustry transactions tables. Sim- 
ilarly, to obtain purchasing power parities for components of intermediate in- 
put in each industry, we  aggregate purchasing power parities for goods and 
services delivered by that industry to other industries. We  employ relative 34  Dale W.  Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda 
Table 1.1  List of Industries 































Agriculture, forestry, & fisheries 
Mining 
Construction 
Food & kindred products 
Textile mill products 
Apparel & other fabricated textile 
Lumber and wood products, except furniture 
Furniture & fixtures 
Paper & allied products 
Printing, publishing, & allied products 
Chemical & allied products 
Petroleum refinery & coal products 
Rubber & miscellaneous plastic products 
Leather & leather products 
Stone, clay, & glass products 
Primary metal products 
Fabricated metal products 
Machinery 
Electric machinery 
Motor vehicles & equipment 
Transportation equipment, except motors 
Precision instruments 
Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Transportation & communication 
Electric utility & gas supply 
Wholesale & retail trade 
































shares in the value of  deliveries of  intermediate input from other industries 
from the 1970 interindustry transactions tables as weights. 
For both Japan and the United States, capital stocks are divided among 
seven types of depreciable assets and two types of nondepreciable assets for 
each industry. These assets are further subdivided among legal forms of orga- 
nization. We  employ the equality between the price of  an asset and the dis- 
counted flow of future capital services to derive service prices for capital in- 
put. Although we estimate the decline in efficiency of capital goods for each 
component of  capital input separately for Japan and the United States, we 
assume that the relative efficiency of new capital goods in a given industry is 
the same in both countries. The appropriate purchasing power parity for new 
capital goods is the purchasing power parity for the corresponding component 
of investment goods output. To  obtain the purchasing power parity for capital 
input, we multiply the purchasing power parity for investment goods by the 35  International Competitiveness 
Table 1.2  The Japanese Price Index 'Ikansformed by the Purchasing Power 
Parity Index at 1970 (United States Price = 1.000) 
output  Capital  Labor  Energy  Material 
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Note: See table 1.1 for key to industry abbreviations 
ratio of the price of capital goods for Japan relative to the United States. The 
resulting price index represents the purchasing power parity for capital input. 
For both Japan and the United States, labor inputs are cross-classified by 
employment status, sex, age, education, and occupation. Given the detailed 
classification of labor input for each industry in our data base, we construct 
purchasing power parities for labor input on the basis of relative wage levels 
for each component of labor input in each industry. Purchasing power parities 
for industry output, capital, labor, energy, and other intermediate inputs in 
1970 are shown in table 1.2. 
According to our purchasing power parities for industry output in  1970, 
prices in Japan were higher than those in the United States in only six sec- 
tors-agriculture-forestry-fisheries,  construction, food and kindred products, 36  Dale W.  Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda 
petroleum refinery and coal products, rubber products, and electricity and 
gas. The purchasing power parities for labor input in 1970 represent substan- 
tially lower costs of labor input in Japan relative to the United States. In that 
year, hourly wages in Japan were 30% or less of U.S. hourly wages. By con- 
trast, the cost of  capital in Japan averaged about 80% of  that in the United 
States in 1970. The purchasing power parities for intermediate inputs are cal- 
culated as a weighted average of the purchasing power parities of  industry 
outputs. The cost of intermediate inputs in Japan, other than energy, is 60%- 
90% of the cost in the United States in 1970. On the other hand, the purchas- 
ing power parities for energy inputs in  1970 are greater than unity, implying 
that the cost of energy in Japan was higher than that in the United States. 
We  have estimated purchasing power parities between the yen and the dol- 
lar in  1970 for the 29 industries listed in table l.  l above. We  have also com- 
piled price indices for industry outputs and  inputs in both countries for the 
period of  1960-85. We obtain indices of prices of outputs and inputs for each 
industry in  Japan relative to those in  the United States for each year from 
equation (2) above. Table 1.3 presents time series for price indices of value 
added and capital and labor inputs for the period 1960-85  in Japan and the 
United States. Column 1 of the table represents the yen-dollar exchange rate. 
The second and third columns represent price indices for Japan. The second 
column gives the domestic price index with  base equal to the purchasing 
power parity in 1970. The third column gives this price index, divided by an 
index of the yen-dollar exchange rate, equal to one in  1970. The fourth col- 
umn gives the corresponding price index in the United States with base equal 
to one in 1970. 
According to the results presented in table 1.3, the price deflator for aggre- 
gate value added in Japan was 0.49401 in 1960, while that in the United States 
was 0.78454 in that year. This implies that the Japanese aggregate price index 
in 1960 was only 63% of that in the United States. Under the fixed yen-dollar 
exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar that prevailed until 1970, the ratio of 
the Japanese price index to the U.S. price index rose to 76% in 1970. With the 
collapse of the fixed-exchange-rate regime in  1970 and the beginning of the 
energy crisis in 1973, the price index in Japan, denominated in dollars, ex- 
ceeded the corresponding U.S. price index. This was a consequence of more 
rapid inflation in Japan and a substantial appreciation of the yen through 1973. 
The competitiveness of U.S. industries relative to their Japanese counterparts 
reached a temporary peak in that year. 
After 1973 the U.S. inflation rate continued at a high level, while Japan 
underwent a severe deflation, accompanied by depreciation of the yen. This 
had the short-run effect of restoring the competitiveness of  Japanese indus- 
tries. Inflation resumed in Japan after 1974, and the yen was allowed to appre- 
ciate again, reaching an exchange rate of 210 yen to the dollar in 1978. Once 
again, Japanese prices,  denominated  in  terms of  dollars,  exceeded U.S. 
prices. This situation continued until  1980 as inflation in the United States 37  International Competitiveness 
Table 1.3  Comparison of Trend of Value-added Price Index between Japan and 
the United States 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Exchange  Value-added  Value-added  Value-added 



































































































































Nore: Col.  1 is the observed exchange rate (yerddollar); col 2 is the Japanese price index trans- 
formed by the purchasing power parity (PPP) index; col3 is the Japanese PPP-based price index 
denominated by exchange rate; col. 4 is the U.S.  corresponding  price index. 
continued at high rates. In the 1980s U.S. prices in dollars rose to well above 
the level of  Japanese prices due to the rapid appreciation of the U.S.  dollar 
relative to the Japanese yen. By  1985 the Japanese price level in dollars was 
only 83% of the U.S. price, which implies that Japanese industries had a sub- 
stantial competitive advantage relative to their U.S. counterparts. 
According to the international comparison of capital input prices shown in 
table 1.4, the cost of capital in Japan in  1960 was almost 78% of that in the 
United States and gradually rose to within 89% of  the U.S.  level by  1970. 
After the energy crisis in 1973 the cost of  capital in Japan increased relative 
to the United States, exceeding the U.S. level by  almost 11% in  1978. The 
appreciation of the U.S.  dollar reversed this trend. By  1985 the relative cost 
of capital in Japan had fallen to only 75% of  the U.S.  level, which is below 38  Dale W.  Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda 
Table 1.4  Comparison of Trend of Capital Input Prices  between Japan and the 
United States 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Exchange  Capital  Capital  Capital 
Year  Rate  Japan (1)  Japan (2)  United States 
1960  360  .62499  ,62499  .79723 
1961  360  ,7001  .7001  ,80034 
1962  360  ,64268  .64268  .87577 
1963  360  ,62544  ,62544  .9131 
1964  360  .68795  ,68795  ,96814 
1965  360  .68865  ,68865  1.05671 
1966  360  .71741  .71741  1.08764 
1967  360  ,7829  ,7829  1.06235 
1968  360  ,86281  ,86281  1.07711 
1969  360  ,88634  ,88634  1.09371 
1970  360  ,89842  ,89842  1 
1971  348  ,81956  ,8478206  1.07581 
1972  303.1  ,83773  ,9949943  1.16855 
1973  271.7  ,9224  1.2221715  1.22005 
1974  292.1  ,99464  1.2258486  1.12504 
1975  296.8  ,9234  1.1200269  1.29908 
1976  296.5  ,94393  1.1460870  1.42287 
1977  268.3  ,96151  1.2901  364  1.63368 
1978  210.1  1.15219  1.9742427  1.78198 
1979  219.5  1.21611  1.9945312  1.82541 
1980  203  1.00809  1.7877458  1.85044 
1981  219.9  ,98245  1.6083765  2.00438 
1982  235  1.04394  1.5992272  1.96229 
1983  232.2  1.06156  1.6458294  2.13968 
1984  251.1  1.10386  1.5825949  2.43909 
1985  224.05  1.1502  1.848 123  1  2.46379 
Note:  Col. 1 is the observed exchange rate (yeddollar); col 2 is the Japanese price index trans- 
formed by the purchasing power parity (PPP) index; col3 is the Japanese PPP-based price index 
denominated by exchange rate; col. 4 is the U.S. corresponding price index. 
the level that prevailed almost a quarter century earlier, in  1960. The rise in 
the cost of capital in Japan relative to that in the United States after the energy 
crisis was a consequence of the appreciation of the yen. The fall of this rela- 
tive price in the 1980s resulted from the appreciation of the dollar. 
Finally, a comparison of labor input prices in table 1.5 shows that the Japa- 
nese wage rate in 1960 was only 11% the U.S. wage rate. By  1970 the Japa- 
nese wage rate had reached 23% of the U.S. level. Rapid wage increases in 
Japan during the 1970s and the sharp appreciation of the yen raised wage rates 
in Japan to 60% of the U.S. level in 1980. The subsequent appreciation of the 
dollar and rapid wage increases in the United States resulted in a decline in 
Japanese wage rates relative to the United States. The relative price of labor 
input in Japan was only 50% of  the U.S. level in 1985. 39  International Competitiveness 
Table 1.5  Comparison of Trend of Labor  Input Prices between Japan and the 
United States 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Exchange  Labor  Labor  Labor 
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Note:  Col. 1 is the observed exchange rate (yeddollar); col 2 is the Japanese price index trans- 
formed by the purchasing power parity (PPP) index; col3 is the Japanese PPP-based price index 
denominated by  exchange rate; col. 4 is the U.S. corresponding  price index. 
Our international comparisons of  relative prices of  aggregate output and 
inputs show, first, that the Japanese economy has been more competitive than 
the U.S. economy throughout the period 1960-85, except for 1973  and 1978- 
79. Second, lower wage rates have contributed to Japan’s international com- 
petitiveness throughout the period, especially before the energy crisis in 1973. 
Lower costs of capital have also contributed to Japan’s international competi- 
tiveness for most of  the same period with important exceptions in 1973 and 
We  turn next to international competitiveness of  Japanese and U.S. indus- 
tries. Exchange rates play the same role in relative price comparisons at the 
industry level as at the aggregate level. However, industry inputs include en- 
ergy and other intermediate goods as well as the primary factors of produc- 
1978-80. 40  Dale W.  Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda 
tion-capital  and labor inputs. The price of  energy inputs in each industrial 
sector is an aggregate of  inputs of petroleum and coal products and electricity 
and gas products. The relative prices of  the outputs of  these two industries in 
Japan and the United States are given in table 1.6 
The energy crisis of  1973 had an enormous impact on the prices of energy 
in both Japan and the United States. Prices of petroleum and coal products in 
Japan were almost double those in the United States, while prices of  electric- 
ity and gas were about 1.3 times those in the United States in 1985. By com- 
parison petroleum and coal products in Japan were only 1.6 times as expen- 
sive as those in the United States in 1970, while electricity and gas were only 
slightly more expensive in Japan than in the United States in that year. 
Table 1.7 gives average annual growth rates of input prices in Japan and the 
United States in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s at the industry level. Differences 
in the growth rates of the cost of  capital between Japan and the United States 
Table 1.6  Relative Prices of Outputs in 'Lk.0 Energy Industries 
~~~  ~~ 
Petroleum & Coal  Electricity & Gas 
Year  Japan  United States  Japan  United States 
1960  1.71118  .97477  ,83247  .94299 
1965  1.51919  ,94523  1.00311  .96430 
1970  1.59952  1.00000  1.02936  1.00000 
1975  5.34666  2.51780  2.268 13  1.78555 
1980  14.75987  6.46713  5.997  13  3.45804 
1985  13.283  13  5.98764  6.2521  1  5.04334 
Table 1.7  Annual Growth Rate of Prices 
Price Increase (I) 
Period  Source  Japan  United States 
1960-70  Capital service  2.8435  2.2153 
Labor service  12.2062  4.5325 
Energy input  .5881  .45  13 
Material input  2.1515  2.0432 
1970-80  Capital service  -  ,5899  6.3782 
Labor service  11.6868  8.0232 
Energy input  13.8936  15.1777 
Material input  7.7005  8.1342 
Labor service  3.8273  5.2741 
Energy input  1 .2662  4.3062 
Material input  s704  3.2437 
1980-85  Capital service  ,0777  5.9044 
Note: Annual growth rates of each price are estimated in terms of a simple average of an annual 
growth rate by industry in each item. 41  International Competitiveness 
were negligible in the  1960s.  Since 1970,  average rates of  growth in  the 
United States have been considerably higher. The rates of  growth of  wage 
rates in Japan were substantially higher than U.S.  rates throughout in  the 
1960s and 1970s. During the 1980s, however, annual rates of growth of wages 
in the United States exceeded those in Japan by about 1.5% per year. 
The movements of energy input prices were similar in the two countries in 
the  1960s. We  have already described these movements during the energy 
crisis of  the  1970s. Rates of  growth of  energy prices in  the United States 
during the 1980s were about 3% per year higher than those in Japan. This 
implies that differences between energy prices in the two countries have been 
decreasing since 1980, in spite of the relatively high level of energy prices in 
Japan. The growth rates of other intermediate  input prices in the United States 
were also higher than that in Japan after 1980. The higher growth rates of 
input prices in the United States since 1980-including  capital, labor, energy, 
and other intermediate inputs-have  resulted in a substantial deterioration of 
international competitiveness of  U. S. industries relative to  their Japanese 
counterparts. 
1.3  Relative Productivity Levels 
In this section we estimate relative levels of productivity in Japan and the 
United States for each of the 29 industries included in our study. Jorgenson, 
Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987) have reported relative productivity levels for 
the two countries for the period 1960-79.  All Japanese industries had lower 
levels of  productivity than their U.S. counterparts in  1960. However, there 
were nine industries in which productivity gaps between the two countries had 
closed during the period 1960-79.  In 19 industries, differences in productivity 
levels between Japan and the United States remained in 1979. 
Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987) have divided Japanese and U.S. 
industries into seven categories. Type 1 included four industries in which pro- 
ductivity gaps between Japan and the United States were expected to increase 
in the future-agriculture-forestry-fisheries,  textiles, printing and publishing, 
and trade. Type 2 includes industries in which the productivity gaps were de- 
creasing before 1973, but increasing after 1973. These industries were food 
and kindred products, apparel, furniture, rubber, stone and clay, other trans- 
portation equipment, utilities, and other services. Type 3 includes industries 
in which the United States had an advantage in productivity in 1979, but pro- 
ductivity gaps between Japan and the United States were expected to close in 
the near future. This category contains investment-goods industries such as 
nonelectrical machinery, electrical machinery, and motor vehicles. 
Paper and allied products constitute type 4; in this industry U.S. productiv- 
ity levels increased relative to those in Japan before 1973, but the productivity 
gap was decreasing afterward due to deterioration of productivity in the U.S. 
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ing the United States, and construction with negative growth rates of produc- 
tivity in both countries are classified as type 5 and type 6,  respectively. Finally, 
type 7 includes the nine industries in which Japan had a productivity advan- 
tage in  1979. The Japanese advantage was expected to increase in the future. 
These include mining, lumber, chemicals, primary metals, fabricated metals, 
precision instruments, miscellaneous manufacturing, transportation and com- 
munication, and finance and insurance. 
In order to assess the validity of this taxonomy in projecting future patterns 
of relative productivity growth in Japan and the U.S. we consider additional 
observations for the period  1979-1985.  However, we must take note of  the 
following revisions in the data base. First, we have revised U.S. intermediate 
input measures by  constructing a time  series of  interindustry transactions 
tables for the period  1947-85.  The methodology is consistent with the ap- 
proach used for constructing a time series of Japanese interindustry transac- 
tions tables for the period 1960-85.4 Second, we were able to obtain more 
detailed information on wage differentials between full-time employees and 
other employees in Japan. We used this information to improve our estimates 
of  labor compensation for temporary employees, day laborers, and unpaid 
family workers in Japan. 
The earlier estimates of  purchasing power parities for labor input were 
based on relative wage levels for full-time workers in Japan and the United 
States. In the agricultural sector in Japan, however, there is a substantial num- 
ber of irregular and part-time workers, especially unpaid family workers. Tak- 
ing the labor compensation of  these workers into account, we  find that we 
overestimated the purchasing power parity of  labor input in the agricultural 
sector in our earlier work. We  have revised the purchasing power parity index 
of  labor  input  in  the  agriculture-forestry-fisheries  industry  in  1970 from 
0.60588 to 0.21352, as shown table 1.2. This is much closer to results for 
other industries, where we only take account of ordinary full-time employees 
in estimating the purchasing power parity index for labor input. 
The three revisions in the data base have resulted in two substantial changes 
in the taxonomy of industries presented for the period 1960-79  in Jorgenson, 
Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987). The fabricated metal products industry was 
moved to type 1 from the type 7 classification of  Jorgenson, Kuroda, and 
Nishimizu (1987). Second, the trade sector was classified in type 1 and is now 
classified in type 7 in the revised version. The remaining 26 industries were 
classified in the same way as in the industrial taxonomy of the earlier paper. 
A new industrial taxonomy, based on our revised data base for the period 
1960-1985, is given in table 1.8. Industries in which the United States has a 
substantial advantage in productivity in  1980 and productivity gaps between 
Japan and the United States are expected to persist into the future include 
agriculture-forestry-fisheries,  textile products, and printing and publishing in- 
dustries. These industries coincide with type  1 in  Jorgenson, Kuroda, and 
Nishimizu (1987). Productivity growth since 1980 has added three industries 43  International Competitiveness 
to this category-petroleum  and coal products, construction, and food and 
kindred products. These industries were classified in types 2, 5,  and 6 in the 
earlier paper. 
Type 2 includes those industries in which the United States had a productiv- 
ity advantage in  1980 after productivity gaps had  been closing during the 
1960s and 1970s, but the U.S. productivity advantage was expected to grow 
in the future. The industries in this category in the 1987 paper included furni- 
ture and fixtures, rubber products, stone, clay and glass and other transporta- 
tion equipment. Motor vehicles was added to this category in the  1980s. In 
the previous paper this industry was classified as type 3, where the technology 
gaps were expected to close in the near future. 
According to new  evidence on the productivity gap in the motor vehicle 
industry during the period 1980-85,  the gap between Japan and the United 
States had closed by 1982, as we expected from our earlier observations. After 
1983, however, the gap increased again due to rapid productivity growth in 
the U.S. industry. The index of  productivity in motor vehicles in Japan and 
the U.S. during the period 1979-1985  is given in table 1.9. 
Type 3 includes industries in which productivity gaps are expected to close 
in the near future, even though the United States had an productivity advan- 
tage in 1980. Three industries included in this category in Jorgenson, Kuroda, 
and Nishimizu (1987)-leather,  nonelectrical machinery, and electrical ma- 
chinery-had  already attained U.S. levels of productivity by  1980, as we ex- 
pected. In table 1.8 we have reclassified these industries in type 7. Industries 
added to type 3 in the 1980s were apparel, miscellaneous manufacturing, and 
finance, insurance, and real estate, previously classified as type 2 and type-7. 
These are three industries in which we were unable to project relative trends 
in productivity during the 1980s. Finally, type 7 includes industries in which 
Japan had a productivity advantage that we expected to increase in the future. 
Three industries previously classified in type 3 were added to this category in 
the 1980s, so that 12 industries of the 29 are included in type 7. 
In evaluating the usefulness of the industrial taxonomy presented in Jorgen- 
son, Kuroda, and Nishimizu (1987), we find only four industries in which the 
trend of  technology gaps was not projected. The US.  productivity advantage 
was expected to increase in apparel and miscellaneous manufacturing. The 
Japanese advantage was expected to increase in motor vehicles and finance. 
We  conclude that the predictive power of  the Jorgenson-Kuroda-Nishimizu 
taxonomy is substantial. We can also draw attention to the findings from new 
observations during the period  1980-85.  According to table 1.9, industries 
with a clear advantage in productivity in Japan or the United States fall into 
two groups. ?Lpe  1 includes seven industries with a U.S. advantage, while 
Qpe  7 includes 12 industries with a Japanese advantage. 
To  analyze the trend  of  productivity differences between Japan and  the 
United States, we have estimated the mean and variance of relative productiv- 
ity by  industry during the period 1960-85.  The results are shown in figures Table 1.8  An Industrial Taxonomy in Terms of Technology Gaps 
Average Annual Growth Rate of  Productivity 
Technology  1960-70  1980-85  Technology  1970-80 
Type of  Gaps,  Gaps. 
Technology  Industry  1980  Japan  United States  Japan  United States  Japan  United States  1985 
~  ~~ 






(17) Fab. Metal 
Type 2  (8) Furniture 
(13) Rubber 
(15) Stone 
(20) Mot. Veh. 















-  ,155 
,526 
.858 



















-  1.641 
,717 
.37 
-  1.22 

















-  1.07 
-4.56 
-  4.26 
-  ,274 
-  1.707 
-  ,917 
,188 
.02 






























U>J Type 3  (6) Apparel  U>J  2.294  .625  1.414  1.16  .42  .203  U>J 
(28) Service  U>J  1.378  .7  -3.033  .018  ,502  -  1.179  U>J 
(27) Finance  U>J  1.81  .535  .15  .181  3.311  -  1.179  U>J 
Type 5  (25) Utilities  U>J  3.222  2.111  -2.991  -  1.497  .603  -1.668  U>J 
Type 7  (2) Mining  J>U  1.662  1.084  1.722  -5.584  .301  ,045  J>U 
(7) Lumber  J>U  2.781  .965  2.032  .738  3.522  1.211  J>U 
(9) Paper  J>U  1.616  .338  .505  ,233  1.982  1.207  J>U 
(1  1)  Chemical  J>U  3.343  1.501  ,731  -  1.517  2.671  1.63  J>U 
(  14) Leather  U>J  .926  ,452  ,713  1.066  .552  -4.352  J>U 
(16) Prim. Metal  J>U  .915  ,088  .781  .534  .624  -  2.294  J>U 
(18) Machinery  J>U  2.212  ,809  .377  .693  -  1.073  ,785  J=U 
(19) Elec. Mach.  J>U  3.304  ,093  3.663  .693  3.222  .5  J>U 
(22) Prec. Inst.  J>U  1.943  ,729  3.626  .13  1.513  3.105  J>U 
(23) Mfg. Misc.  J>U  1.741  ,647  1.257  .795  .252  .23  J>U 
(24) Trsp. Comm.  J>U  3.056  1.085  .49  ,995  1.186  .251  J>U 
(26) Trade  J>U  2.507  ,077  ,838  .316  .607  2.6  J=U 
Note:  For industry abbreviations, see table 1.1 above. U = United States; J  = Japan. Type 1:  the United States had still an advantage in the  1980 technology. The 
technology gaps are expected to continue to expand in the future. Type 2:  the United States had an advantage in the 1980 technology. Before 1980, the technology gaps 
partly were closing. But they, however, were expanding in 1980’s and are expected to expand in the future.  3:  the United States had an advantage in the  1980 
technology. The technology gaps are expected to close in the near future. Type 5: the United States had an advantage in the 1980 technology. The technology gaps were 
mostly constant during the period 1960-85.  Type 7: Japan had an advantage in the 1980 technology. The technology gaps are expected to continue to expand in the 
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1.1 and  1.2. The mean of relative productivity levels between the two coun- 
tries remained fairly stable during until 1973 and then rose through the 1970s. 
This movement peaked in 1980. Since that time, the trend has reversed with 
gains in productivity levels for the United States during the 1980s. The vari- 
ance of the relative productivity levels shown in figure 1.2 was stable until the 
oil crisis in 1973 and has expanded rapidly since. 
We conclude that the energy crisis had a very substantial impact on patterns 
of  productivity  growth  by  industry.  Both  the  mean  and  the  variance  of 47  International Competitiveness 
relative productivity levels between Japan and the United States expanded 
during the period 1974-80. In the 1980s the mean of the relative productivity 
levels has fallen, while the variance has increased rapidly. This implies that 
the relative productivity levels in the two countries have tended to differ sub- 
stantially among industries, as shown in table 1.9. 
Finally, we turn to international competitiveness between Japan and the 
United States. We can account for movements in the relative prices of industry 
outputs in the two countries by changes in relative input prices and changes in 
relative productivity levels. Figures 1.3a and  1.3b show the relative prices of 
industry outputs between Japan and the United States in terms of dollars. We 
have expressed these prices in logarithmic form so that a negative difference 
implies that the U.S. output price is below the Japanese price, while a positive 
difference implies the Japanese price is below the U.S. price. 
Figure 1.3a includes plots of the relative prices of  industries in which the 
United States has a higher level of  productivity in  1985. In the  1960s the 
Japanese output prices were relatively low, due primarily to lower labor costs. 
Although lower relative wage rates in Japan helped to reduce relative prices of 
output, they were almost totally offset by  the lower levels of  productivity in 
Japan during the 1960s. 
After the energy crisis of  1973, U.S. output prices in the industries plotted 
in figures 1.3a fell relative to Japanese prices until 1980 due to much greater 
increase in energy prices in Japan and appreciation of the yen relative to the 
dollar. During the 1980s the international competitiveness of Japanese indus- 
tries has been increasing in spite of the productivity gains in the United States. 
This is because of  the more rapid increase in U.S. wage rates and costs of 
capital and the appreciation of the dollar. It is especially interesting that output 
prices in textile products, motor vehicles, and  fabricated metals industries 
have been almost the same in Japan and the United States since 1980, notwith- 
standing the increasing U.S. productivity advantage in these industries. 
In figures 1.3a-1.3b,  we present plots of the relative output prices of indus- 
tries in which Japan had a productivity advantage in 1985. The time trends of 
relative prices in these industries during the period 1960-85 are very similar 
to those of industries in which the United States had a productivity advantage. 
Table 1.9  Index of Productivity in Motor Vehicles 
Year  Japan  United States 
1979  .91639  ,97490 
1981  .89246  ,88842 
1983  .85502  ,95674 
1985  .85379  ,98393 
1980  .91050  ,53853 
1982  ,86165  ,84402 
1984  ,85545  1.02915 0.4  I  I 
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
YEAR 
-  Agric.  ..........  Construct.  _____  Foods 





1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
YEAR 
Stone  __  -  Furniture  ____ Rubber 
0 




1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
YEAR 
-  Textile  ......  Printing  --- Petroleum  --  Fob. Metal 
Utilities  Trsp Eqpt  --  -  Mot Veh.  __-- 
'5 
Fig. 1.3a  Tkends of proportional gap of denominated output prices 1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
YEAR 
-  Apparel  _--_  Finance  _-  Services 
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
YEAR 
-Leather  --- Prim Metal ---Machinery  --  Elec Mach 
f 3l  2 
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
YEAR 
-  Mining  ----  Lumber  ........ Paper  --Chemical 
.... 
0.8 
-0.4  Illll,lllrllllll,~l,,,ll 
1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  IE 
YEAR 
5 
Prec. Inst.  ...... Mfg.Misc.  --- TrspCarnrn.  --Trade  - 
Fig. 1.3b  'bends of proportional gap of denominated output prices 50  Dale W.  Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda 
However, the price levels are lower in Japan, so that Japan has a clear advan- 
tage in international competitiveness. These features are especially evident in 
industries classified as type 7 in our industrial taxonomy. 
1.4  Conclusion 
Jorgenson (1988) has recently summarized the results of international com- 
parisons between Japan and the United States. The period 1960-73  was char- 
acterized by substantial economic growth in the United States and very rapid 
economic growth in Japan. Capital input was by far the most important source 
of  growth in  both  countries,  accounting for about 40%  of  U.S.  economic 
growth and 60% of Japanese growth. The period 1973-79  was dominated by 
the energy crisis, which began with drastic increases in petroleum prices in 
1973. Growth slowed significantly in the United States and declined dramati- 
cally in Japan during this period. The growth of  capital input remained the 
most important source of economic growth in both countries, but productivity 
growth at the sectoral level essentially disappeared. 
During the period 1960-73,  productivity growth in Japan exceeded that in 
the United States for almost all industries. After the energy crisis in  1973, 
there were very few significant differences between growth rates of productiv- 
ity in Japanese and U.S. industries. In this paper we have extended these ob- 
servations through 1985. An  important focus for our work has been the as- 
sessment of longer-term trends in productivity growth. In particular, we have 
tried to establish whether or not the slowdown in productivity growth in Japan 
and the United States after the energy crisis has become permanent. For this 
purpose we have focused on productivity growth in both countries since 1979. 
The second issue we have considered is the trend of industry-level produc- 
tivity  differences between the two countries.  Jorgenson, Kuroda,  and Ni- 
shimizu (1987) showed that almost every Japanese industry had a lower level 
of  productivity that its U.S.  counterpart in  1960. By  the end of  the period 
1960-79  there were nine industries in which productivity gaps between the 
two countries had closed.  These industries were primarily concentrated in 
producer’s goods manufacturing and were focused on export-oriented indus- 
tries. In the remaining 19 industries, productivity gaps between Japan and the 
United States remained in 1979. In this paper we have reexamined these find- 
ings in light of the experience accumulated during the period 1979-85. 
We  can summarize our conclusions as follows: after  1970, productivity 
growth deteriorated substantially in both Japan and the United States. An im- 
portant issue is whether the productivity slowdown is a permanent feature of 
both economies. To resolve this issue we can consider average productivity 
growth rates in Japanese and U.S. industries over the period  1960-85,  as 
shown in table 1.10. We  conclude that productivity growth in Japan and the 
United States has revived somewhat since 1980. However, the growth rates 51  International Competitiveness 
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for the period 1980-85 are well below those for the period 1960-73,  espe- 
cially in Japan. 
A second issue is whether productivity levels in Japan and the United States 
have tended to converge. While the mean of relative productivity levels be- 
tween Japan and the United States has fallen since 1980,  the variance has 
expanded rapidly. This implies that convergence of Japanese and U. S.  levels 
of productivity during the 1960s has given way to sharply divergent trends in 
relative productivity by industry during the 1970s and, especially, during the 
1980s.  Figures 1.3a-1.3b provide our results on international competitiveness 
between Japan and the United States. The competitiveness of U.S. industries 
has been declining since 1980,  due to more rapid growth of input prices in the 
United States and the appreciation of the dollar relative to the yen. 
The industrial taxonomy presented by Jorgenson, Kuroda, and Nishimizu 
(1987)  has proved to be relatively robust. The productivity trends by industry 
that was projected on the basis of earlier results have materialized with only a 
few exceptions. While the United States retains an overall advantage in rela- 
tive productivity levels, there is a substantial number of industries where Ja- 
pan has gained an advantage and seems likely to increase it. Perhaps equally 
important, the increase in the variance of  relative productivity levels among 
industries has created opportunities for both countries to benefit from the great 
expansion in Japanese-U.S. trade that has already taken place. However, this 
increase is also an important source of “trade frictions” and will require con- 
tinuing efforts at coordination of trade policies in the two countries. 
Appendix 
The industries in our data base for Japan are classified into 31 industrial sec- 
tors. For the United States, the industries are classified into 35 industrial sec- 
tor~.~  For international comparisons we have aggregated these industries to 52  Dale W.  Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda 
the 29 sectors given in table 1.1. To represent our bilateral models of produc- 
tion we require the following notation: 
q, = price of the output of the ith industry; 
pa, pL,,  pE,,  pM,  = prices of capital, labor, energy, and other intermediate in- 
vK,,  v,,,  vE,,  vM, = value shares of  capital, labor, energy and other interme- 
We  represent the vector of value shares of the ith industry by  vf. Similarly, 
we represent the vector of logarithms of input prices of the ith industry by In 
p,. We employ a time trend T, as an index of technology, and a dummy variable 
D, equal to one for Japan and zero for the United States, to represent differ- 
ences in technology between the two countries. Under competitive conditions 
we can represent technology by a price function that is dual to the production 
function relating each industry’s output to the corresponding inputs, the level 
of technology, and differences in technology between the two countries: 
puts in the ith industry; 
diate inputs in the ith industry. 
In  q, = lnpt’al + a;T + a;D  + Mlnp:B’lnp, + Inp:&T 
(Al)  + lnp,’&D  + 1/2p;,T2 + P;,TD  + YzP~D*, 
(i = 1, 2, . . . ,I). 
For each industry the price of output is a transcendental or, more specifi- 
cally, an exponential function of the logarithms of the input prices. We  refer 
to these functions as translog pricefinctions.6 In this representation the sca- 
lars-a:,a;,P;,,P~-the  vectors-al&,pd-and  the matrices, B’,  are constant 
parameters that differ among industries. These parameters reflect differences 
in technology among industries. Within each industry, differences in technol- 
ogy  among  time periods are represented by  time as an  index of  technol- 
ogy. Differences in technology between Japan and the United States are repre- 
sented by  a dummy variable, equal to one for Japan and zero for the United 
States. 
In analyzing differences in each industry’s production patterns between Ja- 
pan and the United States, we combine the price function with demand func- 
tions for inputs. We  can express these functions as equalities between shares 
of each input in the value of the output of the industry and the elasticity of the 
output price with respect to the price of that input. These elasticities depend 
on input prices, dummy variables for each country, and time as an index of 
technology. The sum of  the elasticities with respect to all inputs is equal to 
unity, so that the value shares also sum to unity. 
For each industry the value shares are equal to the logarithmic derivatives 
of the price function with respect to logarithms of the input prices: 
(A2)  v, = a’  + BI  lnp, + p; T + PbD,  (i = 1, 2, . . . ,I). 53  International Competitiveness 
We  can define rates of  productivity growth, say v,,  as the negative of rates of 
growth of  the price of  output with respect to time, holding the input prices 
constant: 
(A3) 
Similarly, we  can define di$erences  in  technology  between Japan and  the 
U.S.,  say vr,, as the negative of rates of  growth of the price of  output with 
respect to the dummy variable, holding the input prices constant: 
(A4) 
-v,  = a;  + p( In  p, + p;,  T + p,  D,  (i = 1, 2, . . . ,  I). 
-vD, = af  + pi  lnp, + p;,  T  + Pdd  D,  (i = 1, 2, . . . ,  I). 
The price of output, the prices of  inputs, and the value shares for all four 
inputs are observable for each industry in the period 1960-85  in both coun- 
tries. The rates of productivity growth are not directly observable, but average 
rates of productivity growth between two points of time, say T and T-1, can 
be expressed as the difference between a weighted average of growth rates of 
input prices and the growth rates of the price of output for each industry: 
(A5)  -V,  = In q,(T) -  In q,(T- 1) -  v,’ [Inp,(T) -  Inp,(T-  l)], 
(i = 1, 2,. . . ,Z), 
where the average rates of technical change are: 
- 
V,  = %[vT,(T)  +v,(T-  1)1, 
and the weights are given by the average value shares: 
v, = %[v,(T) +  v,(T-  l)]. 
We  refer to the index numbers (A5) as translog price indices of the rates of 
productivity growth.7 
Similarly, differences in productivity v,,  are not directly observable. How- 
ever, the average of these differences for Japan and the United States can be 
expressed as a weighted average of differences between the logarithms of the 
input prices less the difference between logarithms of the output price: 
(A6) -  QDt = In q,(JAPAN) -  In q,(US) -  O,’[ln p,(JAPAN) -  In p,(US)], 
(i = 1, 2, . . . ,Z), 
where the average differences in productivity are 
9,,, = %[v,,(JAPAN)  + vJUS)], 
and the weights are given by the average value shares 
9, = %[v,(JAPAN) + v,(US)]. 
We  refer to the index numbers (A6) as translog price indices of differences in 
productivity. 54  Dale W.  Jorgenson and Masahiro Kuroda 
Notes 
1. Equivalently, these prices could be expressed in terms of yen. 
2.  Christensen, Cummings, and Jorgenson (1980, 1981) have compared aggregate 
outputs, inputs, and productivity levels for nine countries, including Japan and the 
United States. Their estimates of relative productivity levels are based on the method- 
ology for multilateral  comparisons  developed by  Caves,  Christensen,  and Diewert 
(1982a. 1982b). An alternative approach is presented by Denny and Fuss (1983). 
3.  A similar approach is employed by Conrad and Jorgenson (1985) in comparisons 
for 1960-79  among the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and the United States. 
This methodology  is also used by  Nishimizu  and Robinson (1986) in comparisons 
among manufacturing industries in Japan, Korea, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. 
4.  The methodology was originated by Kuroda (1981). 
5.  This classification  is a consolidation  of that used by Jorgenson,  Gollop,  and 
Fraumeni (1987). 
6.  The translog price function was introduced by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau 
(1971, 1973). 
7.  Diewert (1976) showed that the index numbers employed by  Christensen and 
Jorgenson (1973) are exact for the translog price function of Christensen, Jorgenson, 
and Lau (1971, 1973). 
References 
Caves, D. W., L. R. Christensen, W.  E. Diewert.  1982a. Multilateral comparisons of 
output, input, and productivity using superlative index numbers. Economic Journal 
92, no. 365 (March):73-86. 
. 1982b. The economic theory of  index numbers, and the measurement of in- 
put, output, and productivity. Econometrica 50, no. 6 (November):1393-1414. 
Christensen, L. R., D. Cummings, and D. W.  Jorgenson.  1980. Economic growth, 
1947-1973: An international comparison. In New developments in productivity mea- 
surement,  ed. J. W.  Kendrick  and B.  Vaccara, 595-698.  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
. 1981. Relative productivity levels,  1947-1973.  European Economic Review 
16, no. 1 (May):61-94. 
Christensen, L. R., and D. W.  Jorgenson.  1973. Measurement of economic perform- 
ance in the private sector. In The measurement of economic and social performance, 
ed. M. Moss, 233-351.  New York: Columbia University Press. 
Christensen, L. R., D. W.  Jorgenson, and L. J. Lau. 1971. Conjugate duality and the 
transcendental logarithmic production function. Econometrica 39, no. 4 (July) 255- 
56. 
. 1973. Transcendental logarithmic production frontiers. Review of  Economics 
and Statistics 55, no. 1 (February):28-45. 
Conrad, Klaus, and Dale W.  Jorgenson. 1985. Sectoral productivity gaps between the 
United States, Japan, and Germany, 1960-1979.  In Probleme und Perspektiven der 
Weltwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung,  ed. Herbert Giersch, 335-47.  Berlin: Duncker 
and Humblot. 
Denny, M., and M. Fuss.  1983. A general approach to intertemporal and interspatial 
productivity comparisons. Journal of  Econometrics 23, no. 3 (December):3 15-30. 55  International Competitiveness 
Diewert, W.  E. 1976. Exact and superlative index numbers. Journal of  Econometrics 
4, no. 4 (May):l15-46. 
Jorgenson, D. W.  1988. Productivity and economic growth in Japan and the United 
States.  American Economic Review 78, no. 2 (May):217-22. 
Jorgenson, D. W., F. M. Gollop, and B.  M. Fraumeni. 1987. Productivity  and US. 
economic growth. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Jorgenson, D. W., M. Kuroda, and M. Nishimizu. 1987. Japan-U.S. industry-level 
productivity  comparisons, 1960-1979.  Journal of  the Japanese and International 
Economies 1, no. 1 (March): 1-30. 
Jorgenson, D. W., and M.  Nishirnizu.  1978. U.S.  and Japanese economic growth, 
1952-1974:  An  international comparison. Economic Journal 88, no. 352 (Decem- 
ber):707-26. 
. 1981. International differences  in  levels of  technology:  A  comparison be- 
tween U. S. and Japanese industries. In International Roundtable Congress Proceed- 
ings. Tokyo: Institute of Statistical Mathematics. 
Kravis, I. B., A. Heston, and R. Summers. 1978. International comparisons of  real 
product and purchasing power. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Kuroda, M. 198  1. Method of estimation for updating the transactions matrix in input- 
output relationships. Discussion  Paper  no.  1. Keio Economic Observatory, Keio 
University, Tokyo. 
Nishimizu, M.,  and  S. Robinson. 1986. Productivity growth  in  manufacturing.  In 
Industrialization and growth, ed. H. Chenery, S. Robinson, and M. Syrquin, 283- 
308. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Comment  Robert M. Schwab 
This paper is an ideal contribution to a volume on U.S. and Japanese produc- 
tivity. It presents careful estimates of prices, inputs, outputs, and productivity 
for 31 Japanese and 35 U.S.  industries  for the period  from 1960 to 1985. 
These estimates allow Jorgenson and Kuroda to ask and answer a wide range 
of interesting and important questions. Did the differences between Japanese 
and U.S. productivity growth rates narrow or widen during this period? Have 
levels of productivity  converged? What can we learn by looking at patterns 
across industries? 
The productivity estimates are derived in the sources-of-growth framework. 
In that framework, productivity growth over time within a country equals the 
difference between the growth rate of output and the share-weighted growth 
rates of  inputs. Similarly, the difference in the level  of  productivity  across 
countries at a point in time  equals the difference in  output less the share 
weighted differences in inputs. This approach is well developed in the litera- 
ture, and many of  the often-heard  objections to growth  accounting  can be 
raised once again. For  example, payments  to capital are interpreted  as the 
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value of  the marginal product of capital, ignoring capital utilization issues, 
adjustment costs, and so on. Growth accounting imposes an assumption of 
constant returns to scale at the industry level; if this assumption is wrong, then 
the paper’s estimates of productivity growth include scale economies. 
The paper’s estimates of differences in economic performance are dramatic. 
Output grew about 2.5 times faster in Japan than in the United States during 
1960-79.  Roughly 80% of  this difference was  due to differences in input 
growth. The Japanese capital stock grew nearly three times as fast as the U.S. 
capital stock; differences in labor growth were much smaller. The remaining 
20%  represents differences in  total factor productivity growth. These large 
differences in output growth and small differences in labor growth imply large 
differences in the growth of  labor productivity (output per worker). Differ- 
ences in total factor productivity explain about one-quarter of the difference 
in labor productivity, whle the remainder is attributable to differences in the 
growth of capital per worker and intermediate input per worker. 
There are some anomalies in the results for the individual industries. Con- 
sider motor vehicles, for example. Output in this industry grew much faster in 
Japan than in the United States during the twenty-five-year period covered in 
this study. Tables 1.3-1.5  in the paper attribute all of the difference in output 
to differences in inputs; estimated productivity growth was lower in Japan than 
in the United States. This may be correct, but I doubt it; certainly, it is at odds 
with Japan’s growing role in the world automobile and truck markets and the 
widespread belief that Japanese auto firms are the models of  efficiency and 
productivity. A more plausible explanation is that the results for this industry 
are symptomatic of some of the well-known shortcomings of growth account- 
ing. In that framework we measure productivity growth as a residual, and 
therefore our estimates are contaminated by  all sorts of  measurement errors 
inherent in the data. In the aggregate, over a long time period, these errors 
will hopefully cancel and our estimates of  productivity growth will be sound. 
If we focus on any single industry, however, we may not be so fortunate. 
The paper’s analysis of  various subperiods is provocative. In the version of 
the paper presented at the conference, the authors conclude that during the 
1960-70  economic “boom,” productivity growth was substantially higher in 
Japan that in the United States. In the later years, particularly after the oil 
crisis began in  1973, differences in productivity growth between the two 
countries were insignificant. 
I have two comments on this conclusion. First, it is inconsistent with some 
earlier studies of  Japanese and U.S.  economic performance. For example, 
Norsworthy and Malmquist (American Economic Review,  1983) estimated 
that average annual productivity growth in Japan was about eight-tenths of 
a percentage point higher during 1973-78  than during 1965-73,  when  the 
U.S. average fell two-tenths of a point; thus according to the Norsworthy- 
Malmquist estimates, the gap between Japanese and U.S. productivity growth 
widened after the oil shock. There are a number of  possible explanations of 57  International Competitiveness 
these divergent results. The time periods in other studies do not match exactly; 
the studies use different data sets; some studies focus on economic aggregates 
while this study looks at individual industries. Still, these differences are puz- 
zling and deserve further attention. 
Second, if Jorgenson and Kuroda are correct, we are left with the question 
of why productivity trends converged. Perhaps Japan was more vulnerable to 
the oil shock than was the United States. Certainly the Japanese economy was 
more dependent on foreign oil, though it is not clear that increases in foreign 
oil prices would have a larger impact on productivity than would increases in 
domestic oil prices. Perhaps U.S. price controls shielded U.S. industries from 
some of  the short-run effects of  the oil shock, or perhaps differences in the 
structure of production were important. Since there are problems with the oil 
price shock story, and since there is at least some evidence that differences in 
productivity had already begun to narrow during 1970-73,  I suspect that we 
need to look at additional explanations in order to understand this result. 
One such explanation would draw on the “catching up” hypothesis. Advo- 
cates of this hypothesis might argue that Japan was operating well inside the 
best-practices production possibilities frontier after the war. Thus two avenues 
of  growth were available: the frontier would shift out over time, and Japan 
would move closer to the frontier. When Japan had fully adopted all of the 
existing technology, Japanese productivity growth from that point forward 
would be roughly the same as that of other countries. This explanation of 
course has a testable implication; if it is correct, we would expect to find that 
differences in productivity growth were associated with differences in the level 
of productivity. The paper offers some evidence that suggests that this was, in 
fact, the case in some industries, but by no means all. It would therefore seem 
that catching up is a very complex phenomenon and one that deserves a good 
deal of attention in the future. 
In sum, Jorgenson and Kuroda have made an important contribution to the 
literature on international productivity comparisons. Their analysis is meticu- 
lous, wide ranging, and provocative. I am certain that this paper will become 
one of the standard references in this field. 